Often within the contractual relationship performance is the outcome of a sequential game wherein the debtor and the creditor interact strategically. The creditor's conduct may precede or succeed the debtor's (promisor's) performance, and this interaction may generate reliance on the promise and its execution by the debtor which in turn may affect the decisionmaking process of the debtor concerning performance or breach. Reliance may occur before the contract is signed or after the promise becomes binding and legal systems give different weight to the role of reliance if it occurs before or after the contract is signed. In light of the fluid nature of the contractual relationship, the creditor's conduct should be analysed with regard to this sequential frame. Although the optimal level of a creditor's reliance and his related levels of investment in precautions and performance are not directly controlled by the doctrines of comparative negligence and mitigation, these doctrines play a significant role in shaping rules concerning the creditor's conduct.
II. Comparative negligence and mitigation in contract law compared
The core investigation concerns the relationship between comparative negligence and mitigation as regulatory principles of the creditor's conduct and its effect of debtor's decision making process. The first issue is whether these divergent rules concerning the creditor's conduct can be traced back to a unitary principle of cooperation among contracting parties, or if they instead perform different functions, varying in accordance with the nature of the contractual relationships and market structures. Three answers are currently provided by legal systems: (1) to combine comparative negligence and the duty to mitigate into a unitary principle; (2) to group them under a common principle of mitigation, but subdivide operational rules between the duty to mitigate and comparative negligence; and (3) to radically distinguish them by referring to different functions (i.e. deterrence and compensation).
In Continental Europe, legal systems like those of Germany, Austria and Italy adopt a unitary principle, differentiating between pre-and post-breach; while in other systems, comparative negligence and mitigation are distinguished. In the US, mitigation is well recognised while comparative negligence is not.
8 In France, comparative negligence (faute de la victime or du créancier) has been adopted by the Cour de Cassation, but the duty to mitigate has been rejected. 9 In England, the duty to mitigate is widely recognised while contributory negligence with apportionment, which was introduced in tort with the 1945 Act, is limited in contract common law. 10 It should be underlined that even those jurisdictions which reject or limit comparative negligence in the context of a two-party contract often allow apportionment, based on fault, in multiparty contracts.
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Comparative negligence and the duty to mitigate share the common feature of being defenses pleaded by the debtor. They are not affirmative claims, unlike the duty to cooperate, whose breach by the creditor can give rise to an obligation of the debtor to pay damages.
There are differences between the two concerning the applicable standard: care in comparative negligence and reasonableness in mitigation. These differences may lead to different considerations concerning an individual party's ability to act in order to prevent the breach or to minimize its consequences. Reasonableness, in the context of mitigation, often allows subjective elements to be factored in, including, to a limited extent, impecuniosity.
These elements are less frequently considered in comparative negligence. However, the key difference between comparative negligence and mitigation relates to creditor's expectations.
In the case of comparative negligence, precautions by the creditor are based on the expectation of performance, not on that of breach. The opposite is true for mitigation, where the creditor is required to act upon the knowledge of breach or upon the expectation, after repudiation, that the debtor will breach. One additional difference between comparative negligence and mitigation, present in all legal systems to varying degrees, is that expenses incurred by the creditor to take precautions may not be recovered under comparative negligence, but will be recoverable under mitigation if deemed reasonable.
We find comparative negligence in systems that have opted for strict liability for the debtor as well as in fault-based regimes. Thus comparative negligence, when adopted, does not require a particular rule of debtor's liability, being compatible with both strict liability and fault. However, modes of damages' apportionment may change depending upon the debtor's liability regime in place. In a strict liability regime with comparative negligence, the debtor Quarterly, 1995, vol. 73, p. 97, at p. 124 and p. 126. will bear all losses but for those 'attributable' to the creditor's negligence. In a negligence based regime, the creditor will bear all the losses from the breach but for those 'caused' by the debtor's fault.
III. Comparative Negligence
Comparative negligence in contract is expressly recognised by legislation in Germany and Italy, Austria, the Netherlands and Switzerland. 12 Similar principles apply in Poland and Slovenia. 13 In France, recognition has occurred through judicial interpretation.
The rule applied both to contractual and extracontractual liability is often framed within the broader context of causation and is explicitly associated with the limitation of damages.
14 The creditor who has contributed to the breach (or whose conduct has increased the losses flowing therefrom) cannot be fully compensated.
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Creditor's conduct may concern a duty to take precautions affecting probability of breach -e.g. a duty to provide information about the effects of debtor's future performance on creditor's economic activity, a duty to warn about risks associated with debtor's performance or a duty to inspect the good or services and verify lack of conformity once performance is rendered. 16 There is then a wide array of creditor's conducts which do not directly affect the probability of breach, but instead impacts its consequences (e.g. the amount of losses). 
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In Germany, § 254 finds its origins in the principle of good faith. 20 In France, where no codified rules relating to comparative negligence exist, the negligent conduct of the creditor can diminish recoverable damages on the basis of causation even while no mitigation of damages is recognised on the basis of full compensation principle.
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In England, contributory negligence (equivalent to comparative negligence) as a means to apportion losses was introduced by statute in the area of tort law in 1945. 22 Its application to contract law has been limited, however, in order to avoid shifting the task of risk allocation from parties to courts. The application of contributory negligence to contract is well accepted when a breach of contract coincides with a tort. 23 Contributory negligence has also been applied to those cases, as in service provision, where the standard of liability is care rather than strict liability. It does not apply when liability for breach of contract is strict and not associated with carelessness, and its applicability is disputed when the defendant is liable for a contractual duty of care but carelessness does not make him liable in tort. 
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In the US, the application of comparative negligence to contractual liability has generally been rejected. 26 Although a small handful of courts have begun to explicitly recognise its applicability in certain circumstances, the majority of courts and the Restatement 2d of Contracts continue to hold the opposite view.
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Among those legal systems that expressly recognise the principle of comparative negligence, many identify the degree of negligence as a criterion relevant to the apportionment of liability. 28 Thus, while the presence of debtor's fault affects the 'if' question of liability (e.g. whether the debtor can be held liable) regardless of the degree of fault, the level of creditor's fault is important to both the questions of 'if' and 'how much' liability will be attributed to the creditor. In some legal systems, creditor's negligence becomes relevant only when it is preponderant, i.e. beyond 50%.
Two concluding remarks should be made. First, those systems that have introduced a specific rule to apportion liability for breach of contract distinguish this case from that of causation. Comparative negligence is typically depicted as conduct that concurs to the breach without breaking the causal link. Second, there are no strong reasons to exclude apportionment based on causation, even in a pure strict liability regime where both parties have 'contributed' to the breach with no fault. For example, it is possible to allocate losses between parties by alternatively looking at comparative foreseeability.
29

IV. Mitigation
The principle of mitigation has been widely adopted, but its scope and domain vary across legal systems. Mitigation is generally required after breach has occurred, and forces the creditor to seek alternative performance in the market or, when alternative performance is unavailable, to act reasonably to minimise losses flowing from the breach.
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Mitigation can occur in two cases: (a) where the contract has been terminated by the injured party after a material breach; or (b) where the obligations under the contract are still in force, and the injured party has not been discharged from performing its own obligation.
The duty to mitigate is generally referred to in the latter case, but in some legal systems it may also operate in the former. In the latter, the creditor will have to counterperform and seek alternative performance in the market. In the former, the content of the duty may be affected by the decision to terminate. The creditor faces some uncertainty stemming from the risk that termination was wrongful. If that proves to be the case, then seeking alternative performance may be deemed unreasonable mitigation and the creditor may have to bear the costs associated with its decision to seek such alternative performance.
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Does mitigation impose a duty to deal with the breaching promisor? Rarely, a duty to mitigate will translate into a duty to renegotiate the contract after breach. More frequently, mitigation is framed as part of the duty of good faith or, in the international contract law context, the duty of cooperation. 37 The implications are related to criteria concerning the distribution of gains and losses following renegotiation.
When is mitigation reasonable? What is the standard for the mitigator? Generally speaking, the injured party is only required to take reasonable steps to mitigate. This reasonableness is measured both subjectively and objectively. At least two dimensions of reasonableness are considered: one relating to the performance of the specific contract and the costs of mitigation (e.g. repair or cure by the injured party), and the other relating to the market structure. substitute performance. This issue concerns both the offer of a substitute performance by the debtor and the search for an alternative performance in the market.
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Mitigation through cover is more likely to be reasonable when the market is competitive and alternative performances are easily available. The less competitive the market, the more difficult it becomes to find alternative performances and the more 'unreasonable' mitigation through cover becomes, forcing parties to find alternative solutions within the relationship. Thus, the market form is an independent variable that, via reasonableness, affects the existence and the breadth of the duty to mitigate.
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The doctrine of mitigation, as it has particularly been applied in Continental Europe, has important drawbacks insofar as it fails to account for market form. If the market is competitive, it is generally accessible both to the debtor and the creditor. A duty should arise on the creditor only if it is cheaper for him to seek alternative performance than it is for the debtor. If the market is not competitive, it will be difficult for either party to seek alternative performance. In this case cover is unavailable and mitigation will consist of reducing the losses stemming from the breach by negotiating contractual modifications (e.g. reduced quantity, providing alternative goods, etc. reliance concern more the consequences of the breach (L) than its probability (P). Though the issue is hotly debated, reasonableness related to reliance should not be associated with the probability of breach but with that of impossibility or impracticability of performance.
Creditors should rely on performance by debtors and reasonableness should limit the level of investments in relation to impossibility due to force majeure and hardship or frustration. As in comparative negligence, when reasonable reliance applies, the creditor should expect performance unlike in mitigation when she reacts to a breach which has already materialised.
When reliance damages are granted instead of expectation damages, 40 two goals are pursued: protection of the creditor's interest and provision of incentives to rely reasonably on the promised performance. Absent comparative negligence, reliance damages may provide the creditor with better incentives than expectation damages to invest reasonably.
The fault standard, deployed to reduce recoverable damages in comparative negligence when the creditor is negligent, may bring about different results than the reasonableness standard used in reliance when the promisee has overrelied.
40 Reliance damages is the measure of compensation given to a person who suffered an economic harm for acting in reliance on a party's promise who fails to fulfill its obligation, while expectation damages are damages recoverable from a breach of contract. The former is generally limited to incidental damages while the latter is composed of incidental damages and consequential damages.
the debtor only if the former informs the latter, making him aware of its existence. 52 If the creditor fails to inform the debtor about the specific contingencies, damages are not recoverable because unforeseeable. In this case only those losses associated with ordinary market ones can be recovered. 53 Whether the failure to inform depends on negligent conduct is in principle irrelevant when foreseeability is applied, unlike in the case of comparative negligence.
VIII. Explaining the differences between Anglo-American and continental
Europe approaches
The degree of convergence or divergence between the US and Continental Europe depends on the level of analysis: if we consider only comparative negligence in contract, divergences are relatively high, whilst when mitigation is included, divergences decrease.
Furthermore, if -when the debtor's performance is rendered impossible due to the creditor's own conduct -the creditor's duty to cooperate is integrated into the analysis, divergences over the existence of a general principle further decrease. The brief and extremely synthetic examination of different doctrines across jurisdictions has shown that some of them combine allocation of liability and apportionment of damages whilst others allocate liability on the basis on an either-or criterion without apportioning damages. In the former, we should include comparative negligence, mitigation, reasonable reliance and, to a limited extent, foreseeability. Only indirectly, the reciprocal duties of cooperation and good faith constitute a means to apportion damages. Causation and impossibility deploy primarily either/or mechanisms, although for the latter fault and some type of apportionment are sometimes considered.
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The Continental European approach, with important differences among its legal systems, adopts a cooperation principle highlighting the relevance of creditor's pre-and postbreach conduct based on risk-sharing and leading towards loss apportionment.
The US seem to distinguish sharply between a creditor's pre-and post-breach conduct, limiting the mitigation principle to the post-breach phase despite proposals to introduce comparative negligence principles in contract law. 55 However upon deeper scrutiny, the principle (not the rules!) of apportionment related to comparative fault emerges in several doctrines where part of the loss is allocated to the creditor primarily because the risk was initially borne by her or because the risks' allocation has shifted over time, due to unanticipated circumstances. In particular, reasonable reliance, and to some extent foreseeability when apportionment is allowed, seem to play similar functions to comparative negligence in allocating both liabilities and damages in the case of breach: providing incentives to adopt precautionary measures to tackle risks of non-performance and to avoid over-investments.
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How can the differences between the US and England, on the one hand, and part of Continental Europe and international regimes, on the other, be explained?
There are three categories of complementary explanations: historical, philosophical and functional.
Historically, the departure from contributory negligence as a total bar from recovery in R., 1995, vol. 111 , p. 228. 56 For premise that the use of foreseeabilty functions in a similar fashion to comparative negligence on the part of creditor, see Afram Export Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps, SA, 772 F.2d 1358 , 1368 (1985 (stating that debtor could not foresee "imprudent" conduct by creditor and thus damages attributable to creditor's imprudent conduct not recoverable) and Rexnord Corp. v. DeWolff Boberg & Associates, Inc., 286 F.3d 1001 , 1003 -05 (7th Cir. 2002 (noting that the result in Hadley "may have depended on the mill's failure to have protected itself against the consequences of a delay by the carrier by having a spare part on hand" and there "was a sense in which the mill was the author of its own loss").
equivalents to affect the creditor's conduct and the allocation of risks which reduced the need for comparative negligence.
Though they may operate as functional equivalents, divergences are still relevant, going to the core of the different approaches to contractual relationships and contract law in Anglo-American and European continental systems, with all the internal distinctions pointed out earlier. Differences between the US and England -the two common law systems -seem to be more a matter of degree than a divergence of the foundations upon which they are grounded. Overall, considering the deployment of other doctrines, England seems to preserve the more traditional view of Anglo-American contract law as a risk allocation device despite the introduction of comparative negligence, whereas the growing importance of reliance in US contract law partially counteracts strong opposition in the US to comparative negligence.
The philosophical explanation for this divergence builds on the distinction between the higher emphasis on corrective justice in Continental Europe and the more realist and consequentialist approach in the US which is grounded on risk allocation. This distinction may contribute to explaining the use of different doctrines to achieve similar results.
Comparative negligence, more so than mitigation, can be grounded on corrective justice,
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reducing recoverable losses 'caused' by the negligent conduct of the creditor, whereas the use of foreseeability and mitigation can be better justified on consequentialist grounds.
Comparative negligence, whose introduction can also be justified on efficiency grounds, recalls the concept of reciprocity and the obligation to 'protect' the other party's interest.
Failure to do so would impose an additional and unfair burden on the debtor. European systems focus more attention on the cooperative nature of the venture created when parties enter into contractual relationships and the opportunity to share the risks of non performance. 60 The relevance of the market structure and the availability of alternative options when one party is in breach bears a more limited role than that of cooperation. When the emphasis is on the cooperative venture then risk sharing, comparative negligence becomes more appropriate.
To what extent does the increased focus on risk allocation over cooperation in the US explain the resistance to the introduction of comparative negligence in US contract law? In theory risk allocation can occur by using either an either/or system (e.g., strict liability or negligence without defence) or a 'sharing' system, where defences that include apportionment are allowed. In practice, however, US courts continue to be reluctant to address risk allocation through an apportionment-based, risk 'sharing' system.
IX. Concluding remarks
In this paper I have shown that the great divergence concerning the rule of comparative negligence in contract law between England and the US on the one hand, and among European continental systems with the exception of France on the other, needs to be rethought. A wider range of doctrines beyond mitigation should be considered on the ground that they act, at least partially, as functional equivalents to comparative negligence.
The divergence diminishes if we move away from specific doctrines to the general principle of creditor's cooperation. This cooperation is relevant in many doctrines of contract law in the US, and to a lesser extent, England, although it has different scope in these legal systems. In England, where comparative negligence has limited application, the doctrines of causation and foreseeability provide some recognition of creditor's conduct and apportionment of losses. The narrow and very limited recognition of the rule of comparative negligence in the US is 'compensated' for by reference to other apportionment techniques in different doctrines such as those fostering reasonable reliance, mitigation and foreseeability.
In Continental Europe the doctrine of comparative negligence is widely recognised, and its influence has spread into international commercial laws such as CISG and Unidroit principles where both comparative negligence and mitigation are recognised. The principle of creditor's cooperation is well grounded in Continental European legal systems and has also found its way into the new proposal from PECL to DCFR.
The potential explanation for this divergence may vary if we consider the rule of comparative negligence or the principle of creditor's cooperation and its apportionment of losses regime as encompassing different doctrines. The recognition of the principle, under different doctrines but with different weight, does not eliminate the divergence, rather forces us to rethink its reasons. The lack of comparative negligence in the US, when considered along with the deployment of other forms of risk-sharing and apportionment of losses stemming from breach of contract, conforms to the idea that contract law is mainly directed at risk allocation. In European continental systems, the recognition of a general rule of comparative negligence and mitigation delineates a general principle based on the law of obligations, applicable to both contract and tort. Contractual relationships are generally characterised by a legal framework fostering higher level of cooperation. These divergences
